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Abstract 
This study explores the geographic dependencies of echo-chamber communication on 
Twitter during the Brexit campaign. We review the evidence positing that online 
interactions lead to filter bubbles to test whether echo chambers are restricted to 
online patterns of interaction or are associated with physical, in-person interaction. 
We identify the location of users, estimate their partisan affiliation, and finally 
calculate the distance between sender and receiver of @-mentions and retweets. We 
show that polarized online echo-chambers map onto geographically situated social 
networks. More specifically, our results reveal that echo chambers in the Leave 
campaign are associated with geographic proximity and that the reverse relationship 
holds true for the Remain campaign. The study concludes with a discussion of 
primary and secondary effects arising from the interaction between existing physical 
ties and online interactions and argues that the collapsing of distances brought by 
internet technologies may foreground the role of geography within one’s social 
network.  
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Introduction 
Literature on online social networks defines echo chambers as a process of self-
selection that confines communication to ideologically-aligned cliques [1,2]. Political 
communication studies have advanced research on echo-chambers which are seen as 
problematic for democracy as they engender political polarization [3], reinforce 
individual views and preferences [4], and foreclose deliberation [5]. Evidence shows 
that filter bubbles and echo chambers affect a limited subset of the online population 
[6,7] and that politically homogeneous echo chambers are embedded in processes of 
political polarization and selective exposure leading to negative attitudes about out-
group members [8,9]. 
The prevailing narrative about politically homogeneous echo chambers argues 
that the interaction patterns existing in social platforms lead users to engage with 
political content resonating with them [3]. The ideological clustering observed in 
politically homogeneous echo chambers and algorithmic filter bubbles thus stands in 
contrast to the diversity of opinions found in face-to-face interactions. It ultimately 
jeopardizes political compromise as ill-informed individuals inhabit different 
networks in a society increasingly segregated along polarized partisan lines [10]. 
Transposed to the network of tweets about the U.K. E.U. membership referendum, we 
would expect to find echo chambers as a communication artifact resulting from online 
discussion alone. Conversely, we would not expect the geographic locations of users 
to play a significant role in the formation of echo chambers, as echo chambers result 
from social media interactions which are unencumbered by geographic space. 
This paper explores whether echo chambers depart from phenomena occurring 
in offline networks clustering. The null hypothesis is that the forces underpinning 
echo chambers are misrepresented: instead of resulting from interaction in social 
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platforms, echo chambers would reproduce the structural political polarization found 
in physical social networks. Our hypothesis is informed by evidence that bidirectional 
association between geography and network formation is a significant driver of tie-
selection and retention [11]. Furthermore, geographic proximity affects tie-formation 
mechanisms associated both with opportunity and preferences, as physical places can 
be conceived of as a bundle of resources and opportunities with the additional 
characteristic of spatial contiguity [12]. 
In summary, the hypothesis about the geographic embedment of echo 
chambers draws from the homophily model which posits that individuals inhabiting 
physical communities are more likely to connect with others sharing similar social 
characteristics, so that cultural similarities and differences among people can be 
formalized as a function of geographic propinquity [11,13]. Echo chambers moreover 
censor, disallow, or underrepresent competing views by enforcing social homogeneity 
much in line with the bandwagon effect predicted by the homophily model [14]. 
Finally, online social networks are more prone to homophily compared with offline 
networks, which are tied to physical locations where serendipitous exposure to social 
diversity is more likely to happen [15,16]. These factors driving homophily in online 
and offline networks allow for testing whether users engaging in echo-chamber 
communication during the Brexit debate are clustered in geographically homogeneous 
subgraphs. 
 
Background 
The Brexit referendum campaign was held at a time of reported polarization among 
the electorate on the cultural and economic costs and benefits of E.U. membership 
[17]. While older and culturally conservative voters protested the infringement on 
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national sovereignty by European institutions, in addition to being concerned about 
the impact of E.U. workforce mobility on British society, a more liberal-minded 
electorate welcomed the collective decision-making at the heart of the European 
Union and accepted the inward E.U. migration into the U.K. as a source of greater 
diversity [18]. In the run-up to the referendum, the winning campaign to leave the 
Union foregrounded a culturally conservative message centered on the proposition to 
“take back control” from the E.U. by reasserting the sovereignty of the British 
Parliament and courts of justice and curtailing the free movement of E.U. labor. The 
vote to leave the E.U. further exposed a geographical splintering of the country. The 
metropolitan area of London, Scotland, and Northern Ireland voted Remain while the 
rest of England as well as Wales voted Leave [19]. 
Social anxieties surrounding echo chambers posit that social media is another 
force driving political polarization [20], with a growing body of observational 
evidence exploring the role of social media in stratifying users across information 
sources [21]. While the rapid growth of online social networks fostered an expectation 
of higher exposure to a variety of news and politically diverse information [22], they 
also increased the appetite for selective exposure in highly polarized social 
environments [23], with the sharing of controversial news items being particularly 
unlikely to take place in these contexts [24]. The filter bubble hypothesis encapsulates 
these claims by positing that social platforms deploy algorithms designed to quantify 
and monetize social interaction, narrowly confining it to a bubble algorithmically 
populated with information closely matching observed and expressed user preferences 
[25]. 
But researchers have also challenged the notion that social media cause 
selective exposure or ideological polarization, the latter being more pronounced in 
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face-to-face interactions [26,27,28]. Exposure to diverse and even competing opinions 
on polarizing topics was found to occur on social media across various national 
contexts [7,29,30]. Similarly, social media was shown to be coextensive with more 
diverse personal networks which are more likely to include individuals from a 
different political party [31]. Even with scanty evidence linking filter bubbles and 
echo chambers to general social media communication, there is evidence of echo-
chamber communication in several political contexts [4,32,33,34]. In these settings, 
political information was more likely to be retweeted if received from ideologically 
similar sources [32] and cross-ideological information was unlikely to circulate in 
social clusters with a strong group identity [35], with clustering around partisan 
information sources being more prevalent among conservative than liberal voters 
[32,36]. 
One possible explanation for the conflicting evidence on echo chambers is that 
politically homogeneous communication might reflect group formations inherited 
from offline social relations. These homophilic preferences can coexist with social 
media platforms that provide ideologically diverse networks [37]. As such, the 
boundaries of one’s network can be simultaneously permeated by echo chambers 
stemming from offline relationships while being exposed to competing opinions on 
polarizing topics that circulate on social media. Similar  associational effects have 
been reported in the literature, with the relationship between spatial distance and 
users’ interaction on social media found to be significant, and friendship ties in 
densely connected groups arising at shorter spatial distances compared with social ties 
between members of different groups [38]. More importantly, research found social 
ties on Twitter to be constrained by geographical distance with an over-representation 
of ties confined to distances shorter than 100 kilometers [39]. These geographic 
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constraints are likely to interact with the geographic patterning of the Brexit vote, 
which reveals spatial and associational segregation, with a spatial distribution in 
which people are more likely to talk to those who are categorically more similar to 
them.  
Taking these considerations into account, we expect echo-chamber 
communication to be prevalent in the Brexit campaign (H1). In other words, we 
expect users identified with one side of the campaign to be more likely to engage with 
politically homogeneous groups. We refer to this pattern of echo chamber in which 
both sender and receiver are tweeting the same campaign as in-bubble interactions 
and we test this hypothesis for the Leave (H1a) and the Remain (H1b) campaigns. In 
view of the homophily dependencies reviewed hitherto, we also expect echo-chamber 
communication to be at least partially mirrored by geographic proximity. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that echo chambers are to be found predominantly in geographically 
proximate in-bubbles both in the Leave (H2a) and the Remain (H2b) campaigns. We 
refer to this geographically-bounded and politically homogeneous group as 
neighboring in-bubble communication in opposition to cross-bubble, when users 
interact with the other side of the campaign, and out-bubble, when users interact with 
a neutral user. 
Thirdly, we take stock of the geographic factor possibly driving echo 
chambers and hypothesize that in-bubbles will cover shorter geographic distances 
compared with out- and cross-bubbles, both in the Leave (H3a) and Remain (H3b) 
campaigns. Hypotheses H2 and H3 are thus intrinsically connected: while the former 
explores whether echo chambers are more likely to span shorter distances, the latter 
(H3) probes whether distance is also associated with cross-bubble and out-bubble 
communication. Testing these hypotheses allows us to subsequently probe whether 
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Leave interactions are more likely to be neighboring in-bubbles compared with 
Remain interactions (H4). Finally, and most importantly for the aims of this study, we 
postulated that echo-chamber communication (in-bubble) is associated with the 
geographic distance covered by messages in the Leave (H5a) and Remain (H5b) 
campaigns. As shown in Table 1, we proceed from a relatively simple hypothesis of 
whether echo-chamber communication occurred in the Brexit debate on Twitter 
towards the last hypothesis testing the geographic dependencies of echo chambers. 
 
Table 1: Summary of tested hypotheses 
H1 H1a Echo-chamber communication is prevalent in the Leave campaign 
H1b Echo-chamber communication is prevalent in the Remain campaign 
H2 H2a Leave echo-chamber communication is marked by geographic proximity 
H2b Remain echo-chambers are marked by geographic proximity 
H3 H3a Leave in-bubble communication covers shorter geographic distances  
H3b Remain in-bubble communication covers shorter geographic distances  
H4 H4 Leave interactions more likely to be neighboring in-bubbles 
H5 H5a Leave echo-chambers are associated with the geographic distance  
H5b Remain echo-chambers are associated with the geographic distance 
 
Methods 
We relied on the Twitter Streaming and REST Application Programming Interfaces 
(API), the endpoints Twitter offers to programmatically collect data, to amass a total 
of 5,099,180 tweets using a set of keywords and hashtags, including relatively neutral 
tags such as referendum, inorout, and euref, but more importantly, messages that used 
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hashtags clearly aligned with the Leave campaign: voteleave, leaveeu, takecontrol, 
no2eu, betteroffout, voteout, britainout, beleave, iwantout, and loveeuropeleaveeu; 
and hashtags clearly aligned with the Remain campaign: strongerin, leadnotleave, 
votein, voteremain, moreincommon, yes2eu, yestoeu, betteroffin, ukineu, and 
lovenotleave. Reports of the most commonly used hashtags outside the search criteria 
were generated daily, inspected on a rolling basis, and added to the pool of terms 
whenever they proved to be relevant. This approach allowed for the expansion of the 
initial search criteria by consolidating the set of hashtags recurrently tweeted by users. 
The queried hashtags were parsed across multiple pools to avoid API filtering. 
Queries that exceeded the one-percent threshold were parsed across separate queries, 
cumulatively requiring a combination of twelve independent calls to the Streaming 
API. We subsequently removed messages tweeted before 15 April 2016, the starting 
date of the official campaign period, and after 24 June 2016, the end of the 
referendum campaign. The resulting dataset includes campaign-aligned hashtagged 
tweets that we leveraged to identify messages advocating each side of the referendum: 
the Vote Leave or Vote Remain campaigns. 
Next, we identify the location of users in our dataset by triangulating 
information from geocoded tweets (subsequently reverse-geocoded), locations 
identified in their user profile (then geocoded), and information that appeared in their 
tweets. The triangulation prioritizes the signal with higher precision, hence geocoded 
information is preferred if present. When not available, we look at the location field in 
users’ profiles and geocode that location. If neither source of information is available, 
we check for information in their tweets, but only in cases where the place_id field of 
the API response returns relevant information. As a result, a considerable portion of 
user locations in our dataset could be identified only to city or postcode level. Upon 
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identifying the location of users, we remove users located outside the United 
Kingdom or whose location we could not identify up to postcode level. This reduces 
our dataset to 565,028 messages or 11% of all collected messages; a sample of 
messages deemed sufficiently large [39] to allow for exploring the geographic 
dispersion of Vote Leave and Vote Remain Campaigns. 
We rely on the use of highly-charged hashtags (i.e., takebackcontrol or 
lovenotleave) as a proxy to users’ ideological position. For each tweet, we count the 
number of hashtags advocating the Leave and Remain campaigns. We tag the 
message as Remainer or Leaver on the basis of the highest number of hashtags used. 
Messages without hashtags advocating one of the campaigns are tagged as Neutral. 
This information, once aggregated, additionally serves to identify the affiliation of 
users that tweeted or retweeted politically polarized hashtags. Highly polarized 
messages―i.e., tweets including several one-sided hashtags, are however uncommon. 
For users championing the Vote Leave campaign, only 16% of their messages 
included more than a single one-sided hashtag. These messages are yet more 
uncommon in the Remain campaign, where only 2% of messages included more than 
one hashtag clearly associated with that side of the campaign. 
We subsequently identify the campaign affiliation (Leave or Remain) of users 
@-mentioned or retweeted in the original tweet. To achieve this, we loop through the 
dataset to find messages tweeted by these recipients that championed either side of the 
campaign. We calculate the mode or “mean affiliation” per user based on the 
frequency of one-sided hashtags used throughout the period. The mean affiliation per 
user can only be calculated for users that actively participated in the referendum 
campaign on Twitter. In other words, for users at the receiving end (@-mentioned or 
retweeted) to be identified as Leaver or Remainer, the user in question must have 
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tweeted or retweeted a separate tweet with hashtags clearly aligned with one side of 
the campaign, whereas users that tweeted an equal number of Remain and Leave 
hashtags are tagged as neutral. The rationale for restricting the parameters of 
ideological identification between users was to avoid mainstream media and high-
profile accounts, which are regularly @-mentioned or whose tweets are retweeted 
with the addition of one-sided hashtags, to be classified in either side of the campaign 
battle. The mean affiliation has the added benefit of filtering out retweets or @-
mentions intended as provocation or ironic remark; these messages are offset by the 
broader ideological orientation tweeted by the account, and users that have only 
sourced information or received @-mentions are classified as neutral for not having 
themselves tweeted any partisan hashtag. 
In short, we opted for a more conservative approach to identifying campaign 
affiliation at the receiving end of a tweet so that users are only associated with one 
side of the campaign if the user herself tweeted a partisan message at some point 
during the campaign. We believe this approach grounded on the mean affiliation per 
user reflects strong campaign membership with low probability of false-positives. 
These conservative parameters to identifying campaign affiliation further reduced our 
dataset to 33,889 tweets, the unit of analysis used in this study, posted by 15,299 
unique users. Ultimately, the multiple sampling of the data (timespan, geographic 
location, campaign affiliation of sender and receiver) rendered a highly curated 
dataset comprising ideological markers and geographically enriched data. Given the 
rationale of this project, we believe this dataset offers a defensible if limited 
representation of the debate and our conclusions are conditional on these constraints. 
We followed the directionality of the information to graph a network of @-
mentions and retweets, with A→B when B retweets A and A→B when A mentions B. 
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We operationalize echo chambers as a function of the identified campaign affiliation. 
We tag each tweet as in-bubble if sender and receiver (@-mentioned or retweeted) 
have tweeted the same campaign. We tag the tweet as cross-bubble if the sender has 
tweeted one campaign and the receiver (@-mentioned or retweeted) has tweeted the 
opposite campaign. We tag the tweet as out-bubble if either sender or receiver was 
classified as neutral, which means any of them have not tweeted messages with 
clearly supportive campaign hashtags. Lastly, we deployed a bot detection protocol 
[40] that led to the identification of 237 users with suspicious bot activity whose echo 
chamber activity was limited to only 63 messages. To control for potential issues 
associated with bot activity, we replicated the analysis without this group of users, but 
the test did not yield significantly different results. 
With the location of users defined using the abovementioned triangulation 
approach, we leverage the longitude and latitude values to calculate the Euclidean 
distance (in kilometers) covered by the sender and receiver of @-messages and 
retweets. We use the canonical mean equatorial radius (6378.145 km or 
2.092567257E7 ft.) for earth radius. As such, our calculation is not mathematically 
precise due to the inaccurate estimate of the earth’s radius (R). Despite this perennial 
limitation, we believe the calculation is adequate as mathematical precision is of 
lesser importance when analyzing data whose geographic accuracy is limited to 
postcode level. We repeat the process for each tweet, thus identifying the account 
being @-mentioned or retweeted and calculating the distance (in kilometers) between 
sender and receiver.  
Finally, differences in distance are analyzed with a series of statistical tests, 
including linear regression, Chi-square, and Kolmogorov–Smirnov. For the Chi-
squared tests, we reject the null hypothesis of the independence assumption if the p-
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value of 𝑥2 = ∑
(𝑓𝑖,𝑗 – 𝑒𝑖,𝑗)
2
𝑒𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗  is less than the given significance level α. To test 
Hypotheses H5, we examine if the variables sender’s affiliation and receivers’ 
affiliation are independent and if the probability distribution of one variable is 
affected by the other. 
 
Limitations of the method 
Identifying the location of social media users is a notoriously difficult task given the 
multitude of geographic information made available by social media platforms with 
various levels of accuracy, reliability, and granularity. While only 1% of tweets 
usually include geolocational information [41,42], we have maximized this source by 
relying on the Twitter REST API to collect the 3200 messages available per user and 
searched for geolocation information in their tweets. Upon identifying a positive 
match, we apply this location to tweets authored by the same user that lacked 
geographic information. This approach maximized precision in determining the 
location of users, but there is no way of knowing whether the geolocation refers to a 
place where the user works, studies, lives, or was simply traversing. The same 
ambiguity pervades information made available in the user profiles, which 
furthermore may be entirely fabricated. In view of these caveats, we do not expect the 
geocode and profile data to necessarily reflect users’ home or work location. Instead, 
we rely on this signal as geographic markers between two users sharing political 
homogenous information. In other words, this study explores the interaction between 
different geographic locations and ideological affiliations as opposed to surveying the 
residence of Twitter users in the United Kingdom. Lastly, we relied on the HERE API 
to geocode and reverse geocode geographic location. As the API provides attribute-
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level information about the match quality, we leveraged this information to remove 
API responses with a MatchCity score >.9 and whose field MatchType of 
pointAddress failed to pinpoint the location on the map [43]. 
 
Results 
We evaluated H1 and H2 by testing whether the probability distribution of the 
sender’s and receiver’s affiliation are independent―i.e., one variable is not affected 
by the presence of another. The variables are significantly correlated (r=.66, p<.0001) 
with a Chi-squared value of 9646.4 (p< 2.2e-16). As a result, we conclude that the 
two variables are in fact dependent. We further explored H1a and rejected the null 
hypothesis of the independence assumption at the 95% confidence level, as users 
tweeting the Leave campaign are significantly more likely to interact with users also 
tweeting highly partisan Leave hashtags. In fact, only 9% of messages tweeted by 
users affiliated with the Leave campaign were directed to users associated with the 
Remain campaign (cross-bubble communication). This contrasts with 22% of 
interactions directed to neutral users (out-bubble communication) and a towering 69% 
of Leave @-messages and retweets being sourced from or directed to another user 
affiliated with the Leave campaign (in-bubble communication), with little to no 
difference between @-mentions and retweets.  
The intensity of echo-chamber communication is remarkably similar on the 
Remain side of the campaign (H1b), where only 10% of users directed @-mentions or 
retweeted content from users identified with the Leave campaign (cross-bubble 
communication), with 22% of interactions including neutral users (out-bubble 
communication), and a total of 68% of interactions initiated by Remainers being echo 
chambers (in-bubble communication). The likelihood of users campaigning for one 
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side of the referendum engaging with users of the same leaning―instead of neutral or 
adversarial users―was captured by fitting a linear regression model on the sender’s 
affiliation as the explanatory variable of echo-chamber communication: partisan 
affiliation explains nearly half of the variance in the data (R2adj=.44, p<2.2e-16). 
Figure 1 unpacks these findings and shows the prevailing patterns of echo-chamber 
communication compared with out-bubble and cross-bubble communication 
(complementarity), both in the Leave and the Remain campaign, across a range of 
distance radiuses. 
 
Figure 1: (a) Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of in-bubble (echo chambers) and non-bubble 
(out- and cross-bubble) communication; and (b) Histogram of distance travelled by messages between 
sender and receiver in 50-kilometer bins. 
 
We approached H2 by examining whether Leave and Remain interactions are 
predominantly within neighboring in-bubbles or geographically proximate echo 
chambers―i.e., within a 50-kilometer radius expanded in 50-kilometer increments up 
to 900 kilometers―which is the maximum straight-line distance between two 
geographical points in the United Kingdom (from Land’s End to John o’ Groats). We 
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found that most interactions are within a 200km radius, but the geographic trend is 
different between the Leave and Remain campaigns. As shown in Figure 1a, the 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of in-bubble Leave messages covers shorter 
distances compared to non-bubbles (i.e., out- and cross-bubbles), with half of in-
bubble messages covering less than 200 kilometers. The trend is reversed on the 
Remain side of the campaign, in which in-bubble interactions cover longer distances 
compared to non-bubble messages.  
Figure 1b also shows that Leave-campaign messages are chiefly exchanged 
within ideologically and geographically proximate echo chambers, a component of 
echo-chamber communication behavior that we further unpack in the following 
analyses. There is also relatively little cross-ideological retweeting and @-
mentioning, much in line with previous findings reported in the literature [35]. While 
in-bubble is also the prevailing mode of communication on the Remain side of the 
campaign, the trend is however inverted: as distance between sender and receiver 
increases, in-bubble communication becomes more common and covers increasingly 
larger geographic areas compared to out- and cross-bubble interactions. This reversed 
trend depicted in the CDF plot is also captured by the mean distance covered by 
Leave messages, at 199km for in-bubble and 234km for non-bubble (?̃?=168 and 
?̃?=208, respectively). For Remain messages, contrariwise, the mean distance is 
238km for in-bubble and 204km for non-bubble (?̃?=209 and ?̃?=184, respectively). 
This is consistent with Hypotheses H2a and H2b, which state that Leave and 
Remain interactions, respectively, are predominantly within neighboring in-bubbles. 
Figure 2 shows this relationship by contrasting cross-, out-, and in-bubble 
communication across the United Kingdom (we found no difference in the 
communication patterns of @-mentions and retweets). The results lend support to H3a 
 17 
but reject hypothesis H3b, as only Leave echo chambers are likely to cover short 
geographic distances compared with non-bubbles. In fact, there are nearly three times 
as many in-bubble interactions in the Leave campaign for every cross-bubble and out-
bubble communication combined, with the number of users involved in out-bubble 
communication being about half and one-fifth, respectively, of those involved in 
echo-chamber communication.  
Despite echo chambers on the Remain side being independent from 
geographic distance, there is a much higher ratio of interactions falling within in-
bubble patterns. Similarly to the Leave campaign, there are three times as many in-
bubble interactions for every out-bubble, and six times as many for every cross-
bubble interaction. The number of Remain supporters involved in out-bubble 
communication is about two-thirds of those involved in in-bubble communication and 
only a third if we compare cross-bubble with in-bubble. The quantifiable higher 
volume of in-bubble communication has potential implications on the homophily 
patterns observed in cross, out, and in-bubble, as larger groups are likely to be more 
homophilous compared with smaller randomized subsets of the same group [13,44]. 
Yet, while echo chambers in the Leave campaign appear constrained by short 
geographic distances (H3a), this is not the case on the Remain side (H3b). In fact, 
Remain echo chambers are likely to span greater geographic distances while their 
cross-bubble communication is physically concentrated around neighboring 
communities, an indication that users aligned with the Remain campaign tried to cross 
the ideological divide within their communities. 
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Figure 2: (a) Geographic pattern of cross-bubble, out-bubble, and echo chambers (in-bubble) with 
number of vertices and edges in each subgraph and the average distance travelled between sender and 
receiver; and (b) snapshot of the central point of diffusion of the Leave campaign, geographically 
located in the English Midlands, the North, and the East. 
 
We approach H4, which hypothesizes that Leave interactions cover shorter 
geographic distances compared with Remain interactions, by calculating the average 
distance @-mentions and retweets travelled from source to destination for each side 
of the partisan divide. The absolute differences observed across campaigns lend 
support to H4, as one-quarter of Leave interactions took place within 100 kilometers 
whereas fewer than one-fifth followed such pattern in the Remain campaign. The 
average distance covered by Leave partisan messages is also shorter at 178km 
compared with 199km for the Remain campaign. In-bubble communication in the 
Leave campaign covers considerably shorter geographic distance of only 22km 
compared with 40km for the Remain campaign. The pattern persists in out-bubble and 
cross-bubble communication, where Leave messages cover 86 and 197 kilometers 
compared with 103 and 243 for Remain messages, respectively. Figure 2 unpacks 
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these differences and shows the geographic clustering of Leave messages, particularly 
in-bubble interactions, centered in the Brexit heartland of the English Midlands, the 
North, and the East. 
We approach H5a, which hypothesizes that echo-chamber communication is 
associated with geographic proximity in the Leave and Remain campaigns (H5a and 
H5b, respectively), by comparing the density distribution curves of in-, out-, and 
cross-bubble communication subgraphs alongside the density curve of randomly-
generated comparable subgraphs. To this end, we randomly swap the location of users 
in each subgraph (in-, out-, and cross-bubble), recalculate the distance travelled by @-
mention and retweet messages, and compare the observed distribution of distances 
against the random distribution of distances travelled by each message. The rationale 
for this analysis is to identify distributions that deviate from the random reallocation 
of users across geographic locations while preserving individual social networks 
identified by their communications on Twitter as well as the geographic distribution 
of users in the country. We do not assign random locations to users; we simply swap 
the location of users in each subgraph to test if the distribution is similar to the 
random network which preserves the overall geographical distribution of users. This 
approach establishes an association between echo-chamber communication and the 
geography of message diffusion whenever the observed networks―ceteris 
paribus―differ significantly from the random network. In other words, for each 
iteration of the test we retain the set of locations in each subgraph, but randomly 
reorder the locations to test whether geographic dependencies found in echo-chamber 
communication are replicated in the randomized geographic network. 
We ran 100 iterations of each test and the results are summarized in Figure 3: 
the high volume of interactions within geographically proximate echo chambers―i.e., 
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within the 50 kilometers radius―is a considerable departure from the distribution in 
the randomized network. This deviation is particularly prominent in echo-chamber 
communication (i.e., in-bubble interactions). This pattern disappears when the 
location of users is randomly reshuffled, an indication that the distribution is not 
determined by chance. We thus conclude that the geographic distribution of echo-
chamber communication is unlikely, i.e., much less likely to happen than in the 
randomized null model. This unlikely distribution is yet more salient in the subgraph 
of Leave in-bubble interactions and disappears in out- and cross-bubble interactions 
for the Leave campaign and again in the entire network of Remain interactions. In 
other words, the association between geographic proximity and echo-chamber 
communication is restricted to the Leave campaign and lends support to hypothesis 
H5a, while in the Remain campaign we observe no such dynamics and hence reject 
hypothesis H5b. 
 
Figure 3: Distances covered by interactions across in-bubble, out-bubble, and cross-bubble for 
referendum network and subgraphs of the Leave and Remain campaigns, followed by the 
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Kolmogorov–Smirnov test statistic and p-value. The dotted line shows the reference probability 
distribution used to test the similitude of the two samples with a continuous distribution. 
 
To assess the significance of these results, we performed a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test 
on the probability distribution of distances covered by messages compared with the 
probability distribution of distances covered by messages with users’ locations 
randomly reshuffled. In other words, we swap the location of users in the graph and 
calculate the distances covered by their interactions again, thus providing a reference 
probability distribution to test the similitude of the two samples with a continuous 
distribution. Figure 3 shows the test statistic, the maximum distance between the 
Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (ECDF) of the two samples, and the p-
value for each of the tests. The results are significant for all modalities of self-selected 
bubble and each side of the political divide, except for cross-bubble communication, 
which is not significant in any of the subgraphs, likely a result of the small sample 
size of cross-bubble communication as the distributions are similar with no 
superimposed oscillatory disturbances. 
The maximum distance (supremum) between the CDFs of the two samples is 
significantly higher for Leave in-bubble interactions, in which the peak amplitude 
deviates from the pattern observed for the rest of the network and during the random 
reshuffling of users’ locations. The probability of seeing a test statistic as high or 
higher than the one observed if the two samples were drawn from the same 
distribution is vanishingly small. The results thus support hypothesis H5a: echo-
chamber communication in the Leave campaign is likely to be associated with 
geographic proximity, with in-bubble interactions in the Leave campaign showing 
significantly more short distance activity than expected by chance (p<2.20E-16). 
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Hypothesis H5b―that echo-chamber communication is associated with geographic 
proximity in the Remain campaign―is also accepted; echo-chamber communication 
among the Remain camp is associated with geographical distance (p<1.56E-05), but 
the effect is essentially reversed: echo-chamber communication in the Remain 
campaign is more likely to cover larger distances compared with out- and cross-
bubble communication, which on average cover shorter geographic distances. 
In view of the high deviation from the probability distribution of users’ 
locations randomly reshuffled, we sought to further examine hypothesis H5 by 
probing variables that could have interfered with this distribution. We firstly 
speculated that highly-active, super-users in a few cities could have drawn the 
geographic distribution of in-bubble communication in the Leave campaign. 
Secondly, we conjectured that isolated events such as the murder of the Labour 
Member of Parliament Jo Cox could have likewise skewed a distribution that would 
otherwise remain comparable to the remainder of the campaign data. However, we 
managed to rule out these effects by inspecting the probability distribution while 
controlling for these variables. To this end, we performed Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests 
on the observed subgraph of echo-chamber communication in the Leave campaign 
and the same subgraphs minus super-users (maximum 10 tweets). The results rejected 
the hypothesis that the two distributions are significantly different at the 95% 
confidence interval and supports the assumption that the geographic patterning found 
in echo chambers is independent of super-users. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of distances covered by echo-chamber communication (in-bubble) for the 
referendum network and subgraphs of the Leave and Remain campaigns over the 10-week referendum 
campaign (14 April to 23 June). The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test statistic and the p-value indicate the 
differences in the observed and randomized distributions: while in weeks 9-10 observed and 
randomized signals are similar at the network level, there are remarkable and inversed interactions 
between online activity and geography in the Leave and Remain subgraphs. 
 
We addressed our second conjecture by slicing the 10-week period covered by the 
referendum campaign (14 April to 23 June) into four sub-periods comprising weeks 1-
3, weeks 4-6, weeks 7-8, and weeks 9-10 and performing Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests 
on each temporal scenario. The distribution appears to change over time, but the 
geographic patterning associated with echo chambers in the Leave campaign remains 
relatively robust throughout the period. Figure 4 shows the observed and random 
distribution for echo chambers in the referendum network and subgraphs of the Leave 
and Remain campaigns over the 10-week period. Weeks 1-3 show a similar peak to 
the one observed in the aggregate network, which decreases in the weeks 4-8 but 
surges again in the last two weeks of the referendum, where most of the user activity 
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is concentrated. It is interesting to note that in weeks 9-10, which are marked by the 
intense activity of Leave and Remain campaigners, the observed distribution is 
patently similar to the randomized signal at network level, but the separate inspection 
of Leave and Remain subgraphs reveals striking interactions between online activity 
and geography. 
In summary, the weekly variations continued to present peak amplitudes that 
deviate from the rest of the network and from the distribution observed with the 
random reshuffling of users’ locations. The tests thus reveal an inverse geographic 
patterning of echo chambers for Leave and Remain campaigns, particularly in the 
weeks leading up to the vote. Therefore, we conclude that echo chambers in the Leave 
campaign are significantly associated with geographic propinquity and the results 
appear to be robust across classes of Twitter users and during different moments of 
the referendum campaign. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This study identified and substantiated the existence of geographically-bound 
sociopolitical enclaves materializing in polarized echo-chamber communication 
online. The first hypothesis tested in this study is broadly consistent with previous 
results found in the literature [1,2] and research that reported significant evidence of 
echo chamber behavior in the Brexit debate on Facebook [9]. The finding that 
Remainers were more likely to engage in cross-bubble communication is also 
consistent with previous research that found liberals more likely to engage in cross-
ideological retweeting than conservatives [45]. The results of hypothesis H1 are thus 
broadly consistent with previous research: the Brexit debate accentuated the political 
divides among the British public along antagonistic fault lines. As such, it is 
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unsurprising to have found Leave and Remain campaigns engaging in widespread 
echo chamber behavior. 
 It is the results of hypotheses H2-H5 that shed new light on the dynamics of 
echo-chamber communication. By identifying a geographic patterning in online echo 
chambers, particularly in the Leave campaign, where in-bubble communication was 
restricted to physical communities proximate to each other, we have pinpointed one 
force driving echo chambers that is exogenous to online interaction. We nonetheless 
expect others to be at play, with the geographic patterning observed hitherto likely 
interacting with sociodemographic variables that reportedly marked much of the 
Brexit debate [46,47]. While these findings advance the study of echo chambers by 
revealing how geographic distance interacts with this segregative pattern of 
communication, further research is necessary to examine the claim that politically 
homogeneous communication is associated with geographic distance. 
Hypothesis H2-4 also work as a control mechanism. We previously 
established that echo-chamber communication was prevalent in the Brexit debate, and 
that in-bubble interactions were more likely to cover short geographic distances for 
the Leave campaign even after controlling for highly-active users and seasonal 
variations. Yet, only by inspecting the entire network, along with out- and cross-
bubble subgraphs, one could identify the geographic dependency as a development 
restricted to echo-chamber communication. In other words, by extricating in-, out-, 
and cross-bubble communication we managed to differentiate the extent to which 
geographic propinquity relates to being exposed to consonant information versus 
being exposed to heterogeneous information. 
Our results call into question the assumption that echo chambers are a 
communication effect resulting from online discussion alone. The analysis of the data 
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sought to identify the extent to which geography was endogenous to the echo-
chamber subnetwork. The null hypothesis was that the unequal geographic 
distribution of the British population was to be observed at each iteration of the tests, 
with Greater London remaining the central point of information diffusion and echo-
chambers reappearing with relatively unchanged geographic coverage. While the 
network topology remained the same at each iteration, along with the distribution of 
users’ location, the geographic distribution of echo chambers was significantly 
different. The bell-shaped, near-normal distribution of in-, out-, and cross-bubbles in 
the randomized networks present a significant departure from the observed 
geographic coverage of echo chambers and suggests that geography is an exogenous 
force impinging on actors involved in echo-chamber communication during the Brexit 
debate. 
The absence of geographic factors interacting with echo chambers in the 
randomized networks is puzzling because it deviates both from the geographic 
propinquity of echo chambers observed in the Leave campaign and the geographic 
remoteness observed in the Remain camp. The results thus suggest that the 
geographic proximity of Leave echo chambers, and the geographic remoteness of 
Remain echo chambers, are likely driven by the physical clustering of fundamentally 
disparate social networks. Instead of incorporating remote strangers that are activated 
and incorporated as organic members of one’s social network [48], the results suggest 
a spill-over from in-person interaction patterns to online social networking sites, a 
causal hypothesis about the direction of homophily that our data cannot test 
definitively. In other words, and despite the anxieties triggered by filter bubble and 
echo chamber in social platforms, the results suggest that echo chambers are 
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connected with homophilous dependencies in physical social networks that are not as 
such created social media activity. 
The results are particularly interesting when considering that the geographic 
propinquity of online echo chambers was restricted to the Leave campaign. In sharp 
contrast, Remainers appear to have focused their cross-campaign efforts on 
neighboring areas of their community, whereas their echo-chamber communication 
extended to more distant users. This is nonetheless in line with the hypothesis that 
physical social networks are likely to have spilled-over to online debate. The 
fundamental differences in echo-chambers in the Leave and Remain campaigns 
correspond to the demographic makeup of their social networks, with the latter 
bringing together individuals who live, work, and study in locations different and 
often distant from their hometowns [47]. We thus estimate that the significant 
geographic variation found in the data was likely driven not only by the locations 
where the two camps were respectively concentrated in, but also the social positions 
underpinning the geographical location or their constituencies.  
The different social positions occupied by Leavers and Remainers is consist 
with the geographical splintering of the country expressed in the referendum and 
mirrors the antagonism separating urban loci of political and economic power 
epitomized by London and the economically fragile northern Britain. Survey literature 
has long recognized the relationship between spatial clustering and nonresponse in 
household surveys [49]. Contact probability decreases in metropolitan areas where 
cultural events are more likely to happen, with city-dwellers spending more time 
shopping or exploring entertainment options outside of their neighborhoods, thereby 
leading to lower first contact success rates in large metropolitan statistical areas [50]. 
With cities being hubs of the national and global economy, it is unsurprising that 
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individuals living in urban areas would travel more and that their resulting social 
networks be more widely connected. The communication distances covered by their 
interactions should therefore also be lengthier compared with those inhabiting rural or 
low-density areas of the country. 
Further studies should seek to establish the magnitude of the effect and the 
underlying mechanisms through which physical proximity and political affinity 
translates into in-bubble, echo-chamber communication. We expect more intricate 
relationships between existing physical ties and online interactions to be at play 
[38,39], with the relationship between campaign affiliation and geographical 
propinquity capturing only secondary effects of this interaction. Ultimately, the results 
reported in this study challenge the assumption that echo chambers emerge from 
online interactions by uncovering a relationship between extant physical ties and 
echo-chamber communication. If anything, the results suggest that the collapsing of 
distances brought by internet technologies may foreground the role of geography 
within one’s social network. 
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